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Two maitre d's defeated the theory
The dare
It was a late summer night, and the River Cafe offered a gorgeous view of Manhattan. The couple was getting hungry, and a $50 bill in his pocket was a rare occasion. His wife pointed out that he was the guy with the theory of how indirect bribes work, so he could see whether it held up.
He found it as terrifying as the magazine writer had, with no idea what he was afraid of. He screwed up his gumption and went in, then met the sight at the hostess station: two elegantly dressed maitre d's, both smiling. Any innuendo he tried with one would be spotted by the other.
The owner's side
Restaurant owners have good reason to fear a bribable host. If $50 bills move people up the list, diners lose faith in reservations, and so a pair of maitre d's may be the owner's answer to the problem.
He skulked back out with the bill, and the couple walked a long way before they found a restaurant with a table.
Why would an owner fear a bribable host?
Economists call this a principal-agent problem, in which an employee's incentives drift away from the owner's. A bribe to move a party up the list pays the host while the restaurant gets nothing. It also hollows out the value of a reservation, since regular guests start to suspect the list is for sale. Owners who notice this often respond with oversight, including a second person at the door.
How else do restaurants ration scarce tables?
Chef Grant Achatz and partner Nick Kokonas opened Next in Chicago in 2011 and sold prepaid tickets online instead of taking reservations. Prices varied by day and time, the way airline fares and concert seats do. The system turned the scarcity into a visible price paid to the restaurant. Later reservation platforms such as Tock built their business on ticketed dining.
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