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Stock investments were chosen for their standalone returns, not as disguised options to acquire the companies later.
Teledyne had fewer than 50 headquarters employees among more than 40,000, with no human-resources or investor-relations departments.
From 1972 to 1984, Teledyne repurchased 90% of its outstanding shares through eight tender offers.
Teledyne shareholders earned a 42% compound annual return across Singleton’s repurchase tenders.
When Teledyne’s multiple fell and acquisition prices rose, Singleton dismissed the acquisition team and never issued another share.
Teledyne delivered a 20.4% annual compound return for nearly thirty years. One dollar became $180.
When acquisition prices inflated, Teledyne bought substantial interests through insurance portfolios without paying control premiums.
By paying manager bonuses on the average of cash flow and net income, Singleton made profit that was booked but not collected worth only half as much.
Henry Singleton could play chess blindfolded, revealing an extraordinary ability to visualize and reason without direct visual access.
Singleton changed Teledyne’s strategy when reality changed instead of obeying a fixed long-term plan.
Teledyne paired enormous managerial autonomy with one headquarters metric for evaluating and compensating dozens of decentralized businesses.
Teledyne paired decentralized operations with centralized monthly reporting, catching trouble before it became serious.
Singleton rejected transactions that sold low-multiple divisions and bought high-multiple ones merely to manufacture temporary effects.
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