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After a Deadly Crash, Boeing's CEO Chose to Admit Fault

Wilson reasoned that admitting one isolated mistake made grounding the whole 747 fleet less likely.

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American Scandal · Encore: Boeing | No Nerds, No Birds | 2

In September 1985, Boeing chief executive Thornton Wilson walked through Boeing's Seattle headquarters past rows of desks where employees avoided his gaze. Weeks earlier, a Japan Airlines 747 had crashed into a mountain, killing 520 people.

Investigators believed pressurized air had burst through a weak spot in the rear bulkhead and blown the tail apart. Inspectors around the world were examining other 747s, and if they found a design flaw, Boeing's entire 747 fleet could be grounded.

Wilson chose to admit the error rather than deflect, as the company's way of doing things. Boeing then held 52 percent of the commercial plane market, compared with 19 percent for second-place McDonnell Douglas, a dominance Wilson believed it had earned in part by putting integrity above expense.

Company president Frank Schrantz was already waiting in Wilson's office with a manila folder holding the investigators' initial report. Seven years earlier, the same jet had suffered tail damage in a rough landing, and a Boeing team sent to Japan had repaired it incorrectly. The evidence pointed to that error as the cause of the crash.

Schrantz offered the expected corporate responses. Boeing could call the finding only a theory, or say it needed more information before commenting.

Wilson rejected both. He said Boeing would not deflect but would acknowledge that its own maintenance crew had made an incorrect repair and that the evidence pointed to it as the cause. Schrantz asked if he was sure, warning of fines and lawsuits.

Wilson was certain, and the decision was practical as well as principled. He reasoned that admitting an isolated mistake on one airplane made it less likely regulators would feel compelled to ground every 747, something that had never happened to Boeing and would have given Airbus and McDonnell Douglas an opening.

Schrantz left to work on a statement, and Wilson leaned back in his chair, satisfied they would respond honestly and face the consequences. The admission caught Japanese regulators by surprise.

It fit Boeing's history. Since the 1950s, the company had used rigorous testing and chosen safety over cost, even delaying the new 707 in October 1959 for an expensive rudder redesign after a test accident. Pilots had a saying, "if it's not Boeing, we aren't going," and leaders who rose from engineering urged every employee to flag problems.

Questions people ask

What flight was involved in the 1985 crash?

The aircraft was Japan Airlines Flight 123, which crashed on Aug. 12, 1985, after its rear pressure bulkhead ruptured. The pilots kept the crippled jet aloft for about half an hour, but it struck Mount Takamagahara. Four people survived, and 520 died.

Did regulators ground the 747 after the crash?

No. Regulators did not order a fleetwide grounding of the 747. Inspections focused on pressure bulkheads and repair records, and airlines continued operating the type while checks and maintenance procedures were tightened.

Who was Thornton Wilson?

Wilson, known as T. Wilson, led Boeing from 1969 through 1986, a period of growth for the 737 and 747 programs. He was an engineer by training and part of a generation of Boeing leaders who rose through technical ranks.

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